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Abstract We report statistical regularities of the opening and closing auctions of
French equities, focusing on the diffusive properties of the indicative auction price.
Two mechanisms are at play as the auction end time nears: the typical price change
magnitude decreases, favoring underdiffusion, while the rate of these events in-
creases, potentially leading to overdiffusion. A third mechanism, caused by the
strategic behavior of traders, is needed to produce nearly diffusive prices: wait-
ing to submit buy orders until sell orders have decreased the indicative price and
vice-versa.
Research in market micro-structure has focused on the dynamical properties of
open markets [O’Hara, 1997, Bouchaud et al., 2009]. However, main stock ex-
changes have been using auction phases when they open and close for a long time1.
Auctions are known to have many advantages, provided that there are enough partic-
ipants: for example, auction prices are well-defined, correspond to larger liquidity,
and decrease price volatility (and bid-ask spreads) shortly after the opening time and
before closing time (see e.g. Pagano and Schwartz [2003], Chelley-Steeley [2008],
Pagano et al. [2013]).
Only a handful of papers are devoted to the dynamics of auction phases, i.e.,
periods during which market participants may send limit or market orders specifi-
cally for the auction. Boussetta et al. [2016] investigate when fast and slow traders
send their orders during the opening auction phase of the Paris Stock Exchange
and find markedly different behaviors: the slow brokers are active first, while high-
frequency traders are mostly active near the end of auctions. In the same vein, Bellia
et al. [2016] show how and when low-latency traders (identified as high frequency
traders) add or remove liquidity in the pre-opening auction of the Tokyo Stock Ex-
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1 London Stock Exchange and XETRA (Germany) recently added a mid-day short auction phase.
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change. Accordingly, Yergeau [2018] finds typical patterns of high-frequency al-
gorithmic trading in the auctions of XTRA. Challet and Gourianov [2018] analyze
anonymous data from US equities and compute the response functions of the fi-
nal auction price to the addition or cancellation of auction orders as a function of
the time remaining until the auction, which have strikingly different behaviors in
the opening and closing auction phases. Finally, chapter 2 of Lehalle and Laruelle
[2018] reports typical daily patterns of matched volume, in a spirit similar to that of
the present chapter.
1 Auctions, data and notations
The opening auction phase of Paris Stock Exchange starts at 7:15 and ends at 9:00
while the closing auction phase is limited to the period 17:30 to 17:35. The auction
price maximises the matched volume.
From the Thomson Reuters Tick History, we extract auction phase data for the
2013-04-16 components of the CAC40 index. This database contains all the updates
to either the indicative match price or the indicative matched volume in the 2010-08-
02 to 2017-04-12 period, which amounts to 8,095,524 data points for the opening
auctions and 15,007,048 for the closing auctions. Note that the closing auction phase
has about twice as many updates despite being considerably shorter.
For each asset α , we denote the indicative price of auction x ∈ {open,close}
of day d at time t by pixα,d(t), the time of auction x by t
x and the auction price by
pxα,d . Dropping the index α since this paper focuses on a single asset at a time,
the i-th indicative price change occurs at physical time txi,d and its log-return equals
δ pxi,d = logpi
x
d(ti)− logpixd(ti−1). It is useful to work in the time-to-auction (TTA
henceforth) time arrow: setting τ = tx− t, the log-return between the final auction
price and the current indicative is then ∆ pxd(τ) = log p
x
d− logpixd(t)
Similarly, the indicative matched volume is written as W xd (t), while the final vol-
ume is V xd . Finally, when computing averages over days, since updates occur at
random times, we will use time coarsening by δτ seconds, i.e. compute quantity
averages over days within time slices of δτ seconds.
Figure 1 illustrates why auctions deserve attention: the relative importance of the
closing auction volume has more than doubled in the last 10 years. Note that the
relative opening auction volume of French equities is quite small (typically around
1%) and has stayed remarkably constant.
2 From collisions in event time to diffusion in physical time
It is useful to consider the price as the position of a uni-dimensional random walker
and assume that each price change is caused by a collision: if collision i shifts the
price p by δ pi, after N collisions the mean square displacement equals
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Fig. 1 Opening and closing fraction of the total daily volume (median computed over all the tick-
ers) since 2007, showing the global increase of the relative importance of the closing auction, but
not of the opening auction. Medians over assets of monthly medians for single assets.
E([
N
∑
i=1
δ pi]2) ∝ N (1)
if the increments δ pi are i.i.d, a straightforward consequence of the central limit
theorem. This corresponds to standard diffusion. In addition, if the collisions occur
at a constant rate ρ , then time is homogeneous and E(ti) = iρ . As we shall see, none
of these assumptions is true during auctions, which makes them quite interesting
dynamical systems.
2.1 Event rates
In the case of indicative auction prices, the event rate is not constant: the activity
usually increases just before the auction time. This finding is a generic feature of
auctions with fixed end time [Borle et al., 2006], and more generally of human
procrastinating nature when faced with a deadline, be it conference registration [Alfi
et al., 2007] or paying its fee [Alfi et al., 2009].
Let us denote by Nxd(t) = ∑i, 0<txi,d≤t 1 the number of price events (changes) hav-
ing occurred up to time t on day d for auction x. The activity pattern of day d can be
measured by the ratio between the number of events up to time t on day d and the
total number of events which happened that day, defined as νd(t) = Nxd(t)/N
x
d(t
x).
The average and median ν(t) =M(νd)(t), where M stands for either average or me-
dian over days, can be seen in Fig. 2. One similarly defines the fraction between the
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Fig. 2 Average activity patterns for opening and closing auctions (left and right plots, respectively)
for the most active asset (Total). Upper plots: scaled price change events ν at a function of physical
time t. Lower plots: scaled indicative volume fraction ω as a function of t. δτ = 30 seconds for
opening auctions and 5 seconds for closing auctions.
indicative matched volume at time t and the auction volume ω(t) =M(W xd (t)/V
x
d ),
reported in the same figure.
There are clear peaks of changes for both ν and ω at unimaginative physical
times such as 7:30, 8:30, etc., and at round minutes and multiples of 30 seconds dur-
ing the closing auction. This of course denotes a regular behavior of some investors.
If each peak is systematically caused by a single trader, there are reasons to think
that this regularity does inject information and that it will be exploited by more flex-
ible traders. However, sending orders at the same time as other traders is a rational
behavior as it allows one to hide in the crowd, unless one’s orders are systemati-
cally of the same imbalance sign as the aggregate volume at that time. Thus, from
a game theoretical point of view, the emergence of activity peaks is self-organized
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and stable. Nothing constrains the number of peaks and their locations, which are
hence instances of emerging, self-organized conventions. The closing auction being
much shorter than the opening one, it is natural that the peaks should appear at round
minutes, as this somehow provides more obvious peak locations than the opening
auction. When the closing auction lasts for a much longer time, e.g. for US equities,
there are much fewer price activity peaks [Challet and Gourianov, 2018].
The global pattern of price changes and total volume matched clearly differs
between both types of auctions. During opening auctions, the price change rate in-
creases much, starting from a low baseline. During closing auctions, the opposite
happens: price change activity is first large, slows down during the first 2-3 minutes
and then picks up again just before the cut-off time (17:34:45). The average rela-
tive matched volume ω(t) behaves similarly as ν(t) during the opening auctions,
probably because prices changes are mostly caused by the arrival of new matchable
volume, not cancellations. Indeed, half of the open auction events typically happen
in the last 10 minutes for most assets, and half of the volume is matched in the last
minutes. Closing auctions display a different behavior: more than half of the volume
is matched during the first minute, and 80% during the first two minutes. For a few
assets (TOTF.PA, UNBP.PA, for ones), there is a peak of indicative matched volume
up to 10% larger than the auction volume about one minute before the end of the
auction; the same behavior is found in US equity markets [Challet and Gourianov,
2018].
2.2 Activity acceleration
The acceleration pattern of price change rate follows some regularity. To charac-
terize it in a simpler way, it is useful to work in Time-To-Auction τ frame. Since
the latter reverts the time arrow, the activity decelerates as a function of τ . Let us
denote the average event rate ρx(τ) so that the expected number of event in the
period τ to τ + δτ is nx(τ) = E[Nxd(τ + δτ)−Nxd(τ)] = ρx(τ)δτ . Figure 3 shows
nopen(τ) of several assets, together with the smoothed version of nx, denoted by
nxsmoothed = N
x(τ)/τ: if nx ∝ τ−β , so does nxsmoothed but with much less noise, which
helps assessing the presence of a power-law visually. We shall drop the x superscript
when no confusion is possible.
Assuming that n(τ) ∝ τ−β , we perform a robust linear fit of logn(τ) = cst−βτ
for τ ∈ [100,300] seconds and only keep the fits whose t-statistics associated with
β is larger than 5. This particular choice of interval for τ corresponds to a typical
period during which the autocorrelation of δ pi at one lag is roughly constant (see
subsection 2.4). In addition, for each asset, we only keep days during which there
were at least 50 price changes.
If the typical absolute value of price change σ does not depend on τ and is still
i.i.d., Eq. (1) becomes
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Fig. 3 Average number of price changes as a function of the time to auction τ , in seconds, for the
opening auction. Dashed lines refer to nsmoothed. Time coarsing factor δτ = 60s.
E([
N
∑
i=1
δ pi]2) = ∑
i: ti<=τ
E(δ pi)2 ∝ στ1−β (2)
hence the Hurst exponent in τ time, denoted by h, equals (1− β )/2: the price
change rate influences the diffusive pattern in a simple way, given the above ap-
proximations. It is worth noting at this juncture that in the normal time frame the
price is overdiffusive if σ does not depend on τ and if β > 0, i.e., if the rate of price
changes increases near the auction end time and the Hurst exponent in the normal
time arrow is H = (1+β )/2.
2.3 Typical price change
When the indicative price changes, it jumps to the next non-empty tick of the auc-
tion order book. Thus, the typical indicative price change reflects the density of
the latter, which increases as the auction time nears. As a consequence, the typi-
cal price change magnitude σ is not constant but decreases near the auction end
time, or equivalently increases as a function of τ . Once again, for opening auctions,
we find an approximate power-law relationship σ(τ) ∝ τα (see Fig. 4). We apply
the same method as for n(τ) to estimate α: we only keep days during which there
were at least 50 price changes for a given asset; robust fits of logδ p(τ) = cst+ατ
for τ ∈ [100,300] are carried out. Only fits whose t-statistics associated with α are
larger than 5 are kept.
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Fig. 4 Average scale of the log price increment as a function of the time to auction τ , in seconds,
for the opening auction. Dashed lines refer to the smoothed quantity.
2.4 Diffusive properties of indicative prices
It is easy to see why the increase of activity and decrease of the typical magnitude
of price changes have antagonistic and purely mechanistic effects on the diffusive
properties of the indicative auction price in the simplest case: neglecting the auto-
correlations and cross-correlations of both n(τ) and δ pi, Eq. (2) becomes indeed
E
(
∆ p2
)
(τ)' ∑
τ ′<=τ
E(n(τ ′)δ p2(τ ′)) ∝ τh0 (3)
' ∑
τ ′<=τ
E(n(τ ′))E(δ p2(τ ′)) ∝ τ1+α−β = τh
(αβ )
0 , (4)
The first approximation assumes that all δ pi within a time slice are i.i.d, while the
second one assumes no correlation between n and δ p2. The relative merits of both
approximations can be assessed in Fig. 5. The first approximation corresponds to the
continuous black line and the second one to the black dots. Both curves are close
together; however neglecting the dependence between n and |δ p| underestimates the
typical magnitude of ∆ p. The same figure makes it clear that something is wrong
even in the first approximation, as ∑τ ′<=τ E(n(τ ′)δ p2(τ ′)) is about 10 times larger
than E(∆ p2). This discrepancy is mainly due to the bouncing behavior of pi for large
τ: a large δ pi is typically followed by large δ pi+1 of opposite sign, which inflates
E(δ p2) and does not correspond to significant price change as the latter reverts
immediately to a value close to that before event i. This is why trimmed means,
which removes a given fraction of the largest δ pi for each time slice and each day,
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Fig. 5 Average square difference between the auction price and the indicative price τ seconds be-
fore the opening auction. Continuous red lines (bottom of the figure) refer to E(∆ p2)(τ), The upper
black continuous line is ∑τ ′<=τ [n(τ ′)δ p2(τ ′)], and the black dots are ∑τ ′<=τ E[n(τ ′)]E[δ p2(τ ′)].
Left plot: plain averages over all values of δ pi; right plot: trimmed means where the 20% largest
(in absolute value) δ pi for each day and each time slice of δτ = 30 seconds have been removed in
the computation of the averages of quantities based on δ pi.
decrease much this discrepancy. The latter is also due in part to a simple strategic
behavior: during the auction phase, negative indicative price change triggers the
sending of buy orders and vice-versa, causing an intrinsically smaller than expected
∆ p(τ)2 (see below for a more detailed discussion).
Let us now compare the TTA Hurst exponents of the above quantities, plotted
in Fig. 7 for the 6 stocks whose fits of both α and β are deemed significant. Two
features stand out. First, h0 overestimates h, even when accounting for the fairly
large error bars. This implies that the dynamics caused by the interplay between
typical price change shrinking and the acceleration of the activity is more subtle
than the simple approximation above. In fact, interestingly, h0 also overestimates
the Hurst h0 exponent: this emphasizes the fact that the δ pi are not i.i.d.
Indeed, in practice, even linear autocorrelation of both ρ(τ) and δ pi and the
cross-correlation between them are not negligible. Let us focus on the autocorrela-
tion of δ pi, denoted byCδ p(δ i). For each time slice [τ,τ+δτ[, we averageCδ p,d(1)
over all the days for a given asset. Figure 6 plots this quantity versus τ for TOTF.PA,
the most active asset in our dataset. Generally, Cδ p(1) < 0; even more, it becomes
more and more negative near the auction time, i.e., for small τ . Since the price
changes become relatively smaller in that limit, this reflects a purposeful bounce of
the indicative auction price between two close price ticks; the large negative autocor-
relation points to strategic behavior, by which traders try to decrease the immediate
impact of their auction orders by submitting their orders after other orders of the
opposite sign (hence to hide their actions); in fact, the autocorrelation of the sign
of δ p, Csignδp(1) is even smaller than Cδ p(1) for small τ . For large τ , this auto-
correlation also tends to have very small values, which is reinforced by the fact that
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Fig. 6 Autocorrelation between two consecutive price changes within time slices of δτ = 60 sec-
onds, averaged over all days for TOTF.PA.
an outstandingly large δ pi is often followed by a similarly large δ pi+1 of opposite
sign. Thus strategic behavior is more common for small τ .
When Cδ p(1) does not depend on τ , it only modifies the prefactor of τ in Eq. (3)
by a factor of the order
1+Cδ p(1)
1−Cδ p(1) , not the Hurst exponent, and thus explains in part
the discrepancy between E(∆ p2)(τ) and ∑Nτ ′=1E[n(τ
′)δ p(τ ′)2]. The dependence of
Cδ p(1) < 0 on τ modifies the apparent Hurst exponent in a nontrivial way. This is
why we measured h for τ ∈ [100,300], i.e., in a region whereCδ p(1)< 0 is the most
constant.
3 Discussion
Indicative auction prices display non-trivial properties due in part to the antagonis-
tic effects of both the acceleration of activity and the reduction of the typical price
change magnitude. However, the indicative price is much less over-diffusive than
what these two effects alone imply. In other words, the deviation from purely mech-
anistic effects points to a more subtle dynamics. This makes sense, as the traders
have a clear incentive to minimize their easily detectable impact. Their strategic be-
havior results in often alternatively positive and negative indicative price changes,
i.e., in a clearly anti-correlated price changes. Quite tellingly, this negative auto-
correlation is more and more pronounced as the auction end nears.
So far, we have used a basic data type, which nevertheless has a rich behavior.
More detailed data, such as data from the auction book, will allow us to characterize
order strategic placement, the evolution of the average auction book density and the
price impact of new orders and order cancellations much before the auction time, in
the spirit of the response function of Challet and Gourianov [2018], but accounting
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error is at most as large as the symbol.
for both the volume of new auction orders and their immediate impact on the auction
order book.
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